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11 Introduction
Over recent years, the composition of employment has received a great deal of attention,
both from academic researchers and policy makers. This is in part explained by the
growth of the proportion of workers who are self-employed observed in several countries
in the 90s — during which it was the most signiﬁcant source of job growth in some OECD
economies, notably Germany, Canada and Portugal — but also by the important role that
entrepreneurship plays in the debate over the performance of the European Union labor
markets and its employment guidelines.
A set of overlapping reasons has been put forward to explain the observed changes in
employment composition. Traditionally, economists relate self-employment growth with
the deterioration of labor market conditions (Blanchﬂower, 2004). In that sense, self-
employment is seen as a source of jobs for the unemployed, most papers analyzing the re-
lationship between unemployment and self-employment rates. More recently, researchers
have been stressing out other reasons such as the market reaction to overly rigid labor and
product markets and the high level of taxation; changes in industrial organization; the
availability of new employment opportunities in OECD economies; and special policies
directed to foster self-employment entry. These studies include both micro and aggregate
level analyses by Evans and Leighton (1989), Meager (1992), Blanchﬂower and Meyer
(1994), and, more recently, Borjas (1999), Carrasco (1999), and Blanchﬂower (2000).
In this paper we analyze the impact on employment composition of diﬀerent labor
market policies that aﬀect the opportunity cost of self-employment versus salaried work.
These policies include the degree of salaried employment protection and diﬀerent regimes
of compulsory contributions to the social security system made by the self-employed vis
a vis the one in place to salaried workers.
As a start, we develop a matching model of employment determination in which
ﬁrms and workers jointly sort their employment decisions between the salaried and self-
employment sectors. In the spirit of Pissarides (2000), we model the impact on employ-
ment composition of the interaction between labor market rigidity and the direct cost of
being self-employed. On the one hand, ﬁrms hiring salaried workers must comply with
speciﬁc labor legislation that limits their ability to freely adjust the number of workers,
namely through ﬁring restrictions imposed by employment protection legislation. On the
other hand, workers willing to become self-employed must comply with mandatory pay-
ments to the government, not necessarily under the form of taxes, that limit their ability
to enter self-employment. For example, a large number of countries require the payment
of minimum social security contributions regardless of the amount of income raised by
the self-employment activities.
We show that these policies have opposite impacts on employment composition. On
the one hand, higher costs of being self-employed discourage workers to enter this sector,
2and, other things being equal, one should observe a lower probability of transition from
unemployment to self-employment, a higher unemployment rate, and fewer vacancies per
unemployed. The probability of transition to a salaried position should increase. On
the other hand, higher ﬁring costs should result in a larger probability of transition to
self-employment and fewer vacancies per unemployed; we should also observe a lower
probability of transition to salaried work out of unemployment.
We empirically test the model propositions using individual-level data from a set of
13 European countries collected by the European Union Household Panel survey (EUHP)
from 1994–1999. The data on labor market ﬂexibility are collected by the World Compet-
itiveness Report and the cost of self-employment entry is proxied with the ratio of social
security contributions per self-employed to the nominal GDP per capita, from the OECD
Revenue Statistics. In accordance with the model predictions, the empirical results indi-
cate that the positive relationship between labor market rigidity and the probability of
transition to self-employment or salaried work is sensitive to the inclusion of a variable
capturing the cost of entering (and remaining in) self-employment. We ﬁnd a non-linear
relationship between our measures of ﬂexibility and social security costs, and these tran-
sition probabilities. Higher social security contributions paid by the self-employed reduce
the ability of labor market rigidity to explain transitions out of unemployment. Therefore,
the role of self-employment in making labor market rigidities less severe depends on the
barriers to self-employment placed by these mandatory contributions, which have a direct
impact on the income formation of self-employed workers.
This illustrates a key drawback of previous empirical research, which is the failure to
identify the broad eﬀect of labor market policies on the patterns of transitions, and hence
on the employment composition. To analyze the total eﬀect of these policies or outcomes
(for example, ﬁring costs, compulsory contributions, unemployment, and inequality), one
needs to think carefully about how salaried work and self-employment (and other labor
market variables) are going to respond to these policies or outcomes. If, somehow, one
makes more expensive to operate a business, this will crowd out the eﬀect of labor market
rigidities on self-employment entry, and eventually magnify their impact on diﬀerent labor
market outcomes, such as the unemployment rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a search model of
employment determination with salaried and self-employment sectors. Section 3 discusses
the indicators used as measures of our key policy variables and brieﬂy describes the data
sources. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy, and section 5 presents the econometric
results. Section 6 concludes.
32 A matching model of employment composition
This section presents a matching model with two sectors: the salaried sector and the self-
employment sector. Firms and workers jointly sort their employment decisions between
the two sectors. Firms hiring salaried workers must comply with speciﬁc labor legis-
lation that limits their ability to freely adjust the number of workers, namely through
ﬁring restrictions imposed by employment protection legislation. Workers entering self-
employment must comply with mandatory payments to the government that otherwise
would have been supported by the employer. One such requirement, in place in a large
number of OECD countries, is the payment of minimum social security contributions,
regardless of the amount of income raised by self-employment activities.
2.1 The economy
The economy consists of a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived individuals in the unit interval.
Each individual can work either as a salaried or self-employed worker. All agents have
linear utility functions and capital markets are perfect and characterized by a safe interest
rate. Agents decide to become employed or remain unemployed by maximizing utility
under rational expectations over their horizon. They are identical in all respects.
There is also a continuum of ﬁrms, each oﬀering one job, which sort themselves between
the salaried and self-employment sectors. Firms hiring salaried workers must comply
with labor legislation that imposes a ﬁxed cost in case a job is eliminated. By hiring self-
employed workers ﬁrms avoid this cost if the worker is to be laid-oﬀ. However, productivity
of self-employed workers is lower due to their lower attachment to ﬁrms, caused by lower
investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, for example. Each occupied job produces a
constant ﬂow of output and continues producing this output until the relationship breaks
down. We assume that there are no productivity shocks and the only reason for the
interruption of production is an exogenous process that separates workers from jobs.
Agents are separated at constant Poisson rate. After separation, the job is re-advertised
as a vacancy and the worker becomes unemployed to search for another job. Unemployed
workers enjoy income ﬂow b but job vacancies produce and cost nothing.
The allocation of jobs to workers follows the simple framework in Pissarides (2000).
At time t there are n+v jobs, with n of them occupied and v of them vacant. There are
n + u workers in the market, one in each occupied job, and u unemployed. The v vacant
jobs and the u unemployed workers engage in a process of search and matching governed
by an aggregate matching function with constant returns to scale. Firms advertise jobs
either as salaried or self-employment positions.
As shown in Pissarides (2000), the arrival process can be summarized by a single
parameter, the tightness of the market: θ ≡ v/u, where v is the number of vacancies and
u is the number of unemployed workers. Workers arrive to jobs according to a Poisson rate
4q(θ), which has elasticity in the interval (−1,0), and jobs arrive to unemployed workers











There is a matching function, m(u,v), that depends on the tightness of the labor market.









The value of production is a function of a ﬁrm idiosyncratic component and of a match-
quality component. The ﬁrm idiosyncratic component accounts for the ﬁrm’s ability at
providing on-the-job training and qualiﬁcations to its employees. Let us assume that ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity is A, a stochastic variable with support [0,A] and distribution F(A).
Depending on A, the ﬁrm then chooses to advertise the job vacancy either as salaried
work (SW) or self-employment (SE). Job searchers ﬁnd vacancies randomly, then learn
the type of contract oﬀered (SW or SE). After hiring the worker, the quality of the match
worker-job, γ, taken from distribution G(γ), is observed. This distribution is independent
of the job type and we normalize its support to interval [0,1]. Total productivity of a ﬁrm
hiring in sector j = SE,SW is the sum of job-speciﬁc productivity and match quality,
yj = A−aIj=SE +γ, where Ij=SE is the indicator function of sector SE. Due to the lower
attachment of self-employed workers to ﬁrms, we make the assumption that, for the same
realization of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, a job oﬀered in the self-employment sector has
lower productivity than in the salaried work sector. This is modeled by use of constant
a ≥ 0. The ﬁrm and the worker then decide if they want to continue the match. At this
stage, ending the match does not have any associated cost.
If the match continues, the worker and the ﬁrm Nash-bargain wages with equal dis-
tribution of surplus. For salaried positions, the ﬁrm incurs a cost k in case the job breaks
down, which occurs at rate λ. For self-employment positions, the worker incurs a ﬂow cost
c. Self-employment matches also break down at rate λ. Each worker supplies a constant
ﬂow of one unit of working time. There is free entry in the entrepreneurial sector.
The value of a vacant job, V , is
rV = −d + q(θ)(F − V ),
where F is the expected value of a ﬁlled job, d is the cost of searching workers per unit
5of time, and r is the exogenous interest rate. The value of a ﬁlled type j job is
rJj = yj − wj + λ(V − Jj − kIj=SW),
where yj is output, wj work compensation, and λ the rate at which the work relationship
breaks down, j = SW,SE. Notice that Jj depends on the realization of the match quality,
which is unknown when the ﬁrm decides the type of job it will oﬀer to the worker. Since
there is free entry in the entrepreneurial sector, V = 0. These equations yield
F = [q(θ)]
−1 d (1)
Jj = (r + λ)
−1 (yj − wj − λkIj=SW). (2)
The value of being unemployed, U, satisﬁes
rU = b + θq(θ)(E − U),
where E is the expected value of being employed and b the level of unemployment pro-
tection.
The value of being a type j employee is
rWj = wj − cIj=SE + λ(U − Wj),
where c is the cost associated with being self-employed. These equations yield
E = [θq(θ)]
−1 ((r + θq(θ))U − b) (3)
Wj = (r + λ)
−1 (wj − cjIj=SE + λU). (4)
2.2 Wage determination and the acceptance/dismissal decision
We solve the model by backward induction. Let us ﬁrst obtain the wage rate for each
match. Suppose a ﬁrm decides to keep a worker after having oﬀered him a contract of
type SW and having observed the match quality. Wage bargaining with equal share of





(A + γ − kλ + rU). (5)




(A − a + γ + c + rU). (6)
6Wages increase with total productivity. The wage rate for the self-employed also increases
with c since the worker requires partial compensation for having higher costs. Given that,
after observing the match quality, the immediate dismissal of a worker costs nothing,
ﬁrms hiring in sector j do not destroy a job such that Jj ≥ V , j = SW,SE. This implies a
limit match quality under which ﬁrms dismiss the worker. To calculate it, let us compute
Jj as a function of the stochastic variables. Taking (2), substituting yj = A−aIj=SE +γ,










−1 (A − a + γ − c − rU). (8)
The limit match quality under which the ﬁrm dismisses the worker is thus deﬁned by
γSW = −A + kλ + rU (9)
γSE = −A + a + c + rU. (10)
Workers do not leave the job if Wj ≥ U, j = SW,SE; the critical values are the same as
above.
2.3 Choice of contract by ﬁrms
Given A, selection between sectors depends on whether the expected value of oﬀering
a SW contract is higher or lower than oﬀering an SE contract. The expected value of




Jj dG(γ), j = SE,SW. (11)
Firms choose to oﬀer a SW or an SE contract depending on whether ∆ = FSW − FSE is
positive or negative. We can prove the following:
Proposition 1 For all A, ∂∆
∂A > 0 if and only if λk < c + a.
Proof. See appendix B, section B.1.
The above result implies that if λk < c + a and both sectors exist, there is some Ac
such that the ﬁrm prefers to hire in the SW sector if A ≥ Ac, and prefers to hire in the
SE sector if A < Ac. (If λk > c + a, the opposite happens.) Thus, ﬁrms self-sort into
sectors based on the realization of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity A.
There is some empirical evidence that more productive ﬁrms tend to oﬀer salaried
positions. In the EUHP data used in section 3, for instance, the wages of self-employed
workers are roughly 30 percent lower than those of salaried employees. We therefore
7assume that λk < c + a holds; the results of section 2.5 would not change, however, if
λk > c + a were true.
2.4 Closing the model
As pointed out before, free entry in the entrepreneurial sector drives the value of a vacant
job, V , to zero. It remains to determine U and the equilibrium value of θ. The expected
value of being unemployed, U, is determined by equating the expected value of being

































−1 (A − a + γ − c + U (r + 2λ)), (14)
to expression (3). Since Wj ≥ U for the worker to keep a job, it follows from the expression
above that E ≥ U. Finally, market tightness is obtained by solving (1) for θ, with the












2.5 Policy and type of contract
In order to investigate the eﬀects of policy decisions on self-employment, we perform the
derivatives of θ and U with respect to k, c and b. We then use this information to study
the impact of policies on transition probabilities from unemployment to the SE and SW
sectors. To simplify the analysis, let us suppose that the idiosyncratic productivity has a
binary distribution. It assumes the constant, positive level A with probability p, and zero
with probability 1−p. In the spirit of proposition 1, let us suppose that Ac lies somewhere
between 0 and A. The proposition then implies that a SW contract is oﬀered whenever
job-speciﬁc productivity is A, and an SE contract is oﬀered whenever the job-speciﬁc
productivity is 0. We can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity can be either A > 0 or 0, with





∂b are all negative,
and ∂U
∂b is positive.
8Proof. See appendix B, section B.2.
These results are expected. Tightness decreases with the cost of being self-employed
because jobs retained after the match in the SE sector decrease as γSE increases, which
decreases ﬂows out of unemployment (and into self-employment). The eﬀect of a higher
SW job destruction cost is to decrease job creation in the SW sector, which leads to fewer
jobs created and decreased tightness. Unemployment compensation decreases tightness
due to the increase in unemployment permanent income. The reservation wage, rU,
decreases both with c and k. A higher cost of self-employment implies a lower productivity
in that sector. This aﬀects the reservation wage, since U also depends on future prospects
of being employed. Finally, a higher cost of job elimination implies a lower reservation
wage.
At each moment, fraction p(1 − G(γSW)) of the newly created jobs are ﬁlled with
salaried workers, and fraction (1 − p)(1 − G(γSE)) of jobs are ﬁlled with self-employed
workers. The remaining matches are costlessly destroyed. In order to study the impact
of changes in c, k and b on these probabilities, we have to study the impact of those
parameters on γSW and γSE.1 Proposition 3 summarizes our ﬁndings .
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions of proposition 2,
∂γSW








∂c are negative. For p suﬃciently close to 1,
∂γSE
∂c is positive.
Proof. See appendix B, section 3.
In the case of derivative
∂γSE
∂c , there is a positive direct eﬀect through c, and a negative
indirect eﬀect through U. The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates when the SE sector is relatively
small: changes in c, which have a direct impact only on workers in sector SE, do not have
a strong impact on unemployment permanent income. It follows that ∂U
∂c is “ small” and
the direct eﬀect on γSE dominates. We view this as the most plausible case.2
The results in proposition 3 imply that, everything else constant and for economies
with a relatively small self-employment share, higher ﬁring costs imply lower probability
of transition from unemployment to salaried work, and higher probability of transition
from unemployment to self-employment. Higher costs of self-employment originate higher
probability of transition from unemployment to salaried work, and lower probability of
transition from unemployment to self-employment. In the remaining of the paper we
present the data to empirically test these predictions.
1Notice that, since the job destruction rate λ is the same for both sectors, the impact of the param-
eters on the steady-state shares of the two sectors in total employment is similar to that on transition
probabilities (ﬂows).
2The average share of self-employed workers in OECD countries is just over one tenth of total em-
ployment (see table 1).
93 Data
The composition of total employment has shifted in a large number of countries towards
self-employment. The evolution of self-employment in the OECD countries over the last
twenty years has been empirically documented in a number of recent papers (see, for
instance, Blanchﬂower, 2004). If we consider the period between 1986 and 2002 it has
increased in 13 out of the 20 OECD countries included in table 1. This general trend,
however, hides a great deal of variability among national experiences. Whereas in Portugal
self-employment has a procyclical behavior, in Spain it is mainly countercyclical. In some
countries it is quite important for net job creation in recent booms, as is the case of
Canada and Portugal, while in other countries it is responsible for only a small fraction
of net total employment growth, as is the case of the U.S.
[Table 1 about here.]
In order to empirically test the model propositions regarding the impact of policy vari-
ables in self-employment entry and exit, one needs to deﬁne two key variables: a measure
of the degree of employment protection; and a measure of the cost of being self-employed.
This paper uses data on labor market ﬂexibility and social security contributions paid
by the self-employed to explain the observed diversity in the pattern of self-employment
ﬂows across countries. Next, we discuss how to measure these two variables.
3.1 Labor market ﬂexibility
There is a fairly large number of papers studying the impact of labor market ﬂexibility
on employment performance, starting with the seminal paper by Lazear (1990). So far,
however, the empirical research has focused mainly on the eﬀect of labor market ﬂexibility
on the rate and structure of unemployment (see, for example, Nickell, 1997), and on the
determinants of labor force participation. Recently, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) per-
formed a detailed study covering the 1984-1991 period, which extends the one by Lazear
using a panel of OECD countries. Their main ﬁndings are that increasing the ﬂexibility
of the labor market increases the employment rate, the duration of unemployment, and
the rate of participation in the labor force.
In this paper, we argue that the impact of labor market ﬂexibility is not restricted
to the salaried sector, and in general aﬀects the overall structure of employment, namely
the rate of self-employment. Recently, Robson (2003) addresses explicitly the relationship
between a measure of employment protection legislation and the share of self-employment.
He reports evidence of a positive, and in some cases signiﬁcant, correlation between these
two variables. However, this conclusion is sensitive to the measure of self-employment
share used, namely to the inclusion of agricultural self-employment. Robson (2003) uses
the OECD index of employment protection, which has several important drawbacks. The
10ﬁrst is its lack of time series pattern, which does not allow a longitudinal analysis of
cross-country data. A second one is its lack of information on the enforceability of labor
laws across countries.
We follow Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) and use data on labor market ﬂexibility
from the World Competitiveness Report (WCR). This is an annual survey that requests
the opinion of managers on, among many other questions, the ﬂexibility of ﬁrms to adjust
employment levels to economic realities in their countries (see the Appendix for a detailed
description of the survey question). Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) compare these data
with other measures of labor market ﬂexibility. The WCR data are highly correlated
with the cross sectional measures computed by the OECD. Also, the time series validation
shows that the data capture most changes in employment protection legislation occurred in
European countries and coded in Saint-Paul (1996). Table 2 presents summary statistics
by country. As in virtually every employment protection ranking, the U.S. has the highest
degree of labor market ﬂexibility, whereas Italy and Spain have the lowest.
[Table 2 about here.]
3.2 Cost of self-employment
The explanation put forward for the relationship between labor market ﬂexibility and self-
employment is that employers may attempt to circumvent the eﬀects of regulations on
their ability to hire and ﬁre employees by contracting-out self-employed workers. Besides
addressing the ﬁrm’s incentives for hiring self-employed workers, this argument also relates
to the worker’s opportunity cost of entering self-employment. In fact, while reducing the
ﬂows into salaried work, employment protection regulation also reduces the expected
income stream of future salaried work matches. This reduction will be particularly severe
among those who fare worst in the labor market, and thus face lower prospects of being
oﬀered a salaried work position. This, in turn, implies that the ﬂexibility enhancing
eﬀects of self-employment can be easily crowded-out by policies that, having impact in
income formation of the self-employed, decrease the likelihood of transitions by low income
workers into this type of employment.
In the empirical application made in this paper, we proxy the direct costs of being
(entering and remaining) self-employed by the diﬀerences across time and countries in
social security contributions paid by the self-employed. Since the 80’s, European countries
have introduced compulsory social security contribution systems to the self-employed (see
Schoukens, 1999). While these systems were aimed at insuring self-employed workers,
they introduced an additional barrier to self-employment entry, specially for low income
workers.3
3One should stress, however, that cross country comparisons of the ﬁnancing of social security systems
for the self-employed is an extremely hard task. This is both because of diﬀerences in the mechanisms
11In a number of diﬀerent studies other variables were used to measure the cost of being
self-employed, namely income tax rates and interest rates. In cross-country studies, there
are obvious advantages of using social security contributions over income tax rates due to
diﬀerences in tax evasion patterns across countries and over time. Indeed, most European
countries implemented mandatory contributory systems that stipulate minimum levels
of contributions, thus eroding the evasion dimension of most income tax systems. Also,
using interest rates is not quite appropriate to capture the the costs associated with the
type of self-employment matches being created in recent years termed by Pfeiﬀer and
Reize (2000) as “false self-employment”, as they are much closer to salaried employment.
These are low income matches that involve a low level of capital investment, and are not
limited by capital market constraints as one usually thinks of entrepreneurial activities.
The cost of entering and remaining self-employed is measured by the ratio of the social
security contributions paid per self-employed to the GDP per capita. This is obtained
dividing the level of total contributions paid by the self-employed by the number of self-
employed workers, and computing its ratio to the nominal GDP per capita. This gives
us a measure of the ﬁnancial burden imposed on the self-employed by the social security
contributory system.4
Over the last decade and a half, there have been dramatic changes in the level of contri-
butions paid by the self-employed in some countries. Figure 1 shows the variable for four
Southern European countries (with high levels of self-employment, but diﬀerent trends).
The more signiﬁcant developments were the rapid increase in contributions observed in
Spain (and to some extent in Italy), where the share of contributions per self-employed in
per capita GDP almost doubled in the period considered. Meanwhile, in other countries
(for example, in Portugal) one observes the same upward trend, but with contributions
remaining at a very low level relatively to per capita GDP. We should note that a similar
trend was not observed in salaried workers contributions for the social security system,
which remained roughly constant over the same period.
[Figure 1 about here.]
3.3 Micro-level data
We test the model predictions using individual-level data. We use information from six
waves of the European Union Household Panel (EUHP) from 1994–1999. This is a survey
used to determine the income basis and because beneﬁts oﬀered are never completely the same, which
makes the comparison of percentages of contributions of little use. However, in most cases the recent
trend represented a substantial increase in self-employed contributions in some countries since, to prevent
income under-report, the minimum compulsory levels of contributions were deﬁned independently of the
workers’ activity level and diﬀer signiﬁcantly across countries. See Schoukens (1999) for a detailed
description of all the European systems.
4It is important to note that during the sample period we did not observe any relevant change in
social security contribution for salaried work.
12carried out in all 15 countries of the European Union and covers, in a standardized way, the
labor force behavior in these countries. The target population of the EUHP consists of all
individuals living in private households within the EU. The actual data cover the interval
January 1993 through December 1998. The EUHP survey interviews individuals once a
year, and asks them a broad set of questions relating to their labor market experience
during the preceding calendar year. In its ﬁrst wave (1994), the EUHP covered about
60,000 households and 130,000 individuals aged 16+ in twelve countries. The survey
also covers demographics, income, education and training, and housing, among other
individual and household level variables.
This unique survey is the only source of comparable micro-level data across countries
and over time in the EU countries. We use data from 13 out of the 15 EU countries prior
to the 2004 enlargement, namely, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France,
United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria (entered in 1995) and
Finland (entered in 1996). We excluded Luxembourg and Sweden because their data do
not allow us to follow individuals over time.
The labor force status (employed, unemployed and out of the labor force) of each
individual is recorded. We classify employed workers as either salaried or self-employed,
and only consider non-agricultural jobs. Since we are able to follow individuals over time
we observe transitions between diﬀerent states. In table 3 we present all the transitions
observed between salaried work, self-employment and unemployment. The empirical ex-
ercise focuses on some of the oﬀ-diagonal transitions.
[Table 3 about here.]
In the EUHP each respondent is asked a number of demographic questions that we
use in our regression models. This information includes age, schooling, and family size.
These variables were previously found to inﬂuence self-employment transitions in a num-
ber of European countries, including Spain, Finland and the UK. Additionally, we have
information on ﬁnancial variables that are also proven to shape self-employment transi-
tions. These variables include “Other sources of non-work income”, “Home ownership”,
“Outstanding mortgage” and “Lottery amount”. All monetary variables in the diﬀerent
countries were transformed in a single currency unit using the Purchasing Power Parities
(PPP) published by Eurostat and are at 1994 prices.
The degree of government eﬃciency and its impact on employment creation can be
measured by the burden imposed on business activity by the bureaucratic machine. In
order to account for factors that aﬀect product market competition, we also include a
measure of the bureaucratic eﬃciency of each country.
Summary statistics for the variables used in this study are presented in table 4 for the
three relevant samples: salaried, self-employed or unemployed workers.
[Table 4 about here.]
134 The econometric procedure
To study the eﬀect of policy, economic and demographic variables in transitions between
labor market status we use a discrete choice model, in the context of a random utility
approach. This approach is suggested by our theoretical model in the following way: a
given worker will switch state if the expected utility of the destination state exceeds the
expected utility of the origin state.
The usage of a probit model to estimate the probability of transitions along with
country-year level variables induces the presence of structural group eﬀects. We expect
part of the error term in the underlying choice equation to be common across all obser-
vations from a country-year pair, in part because there are unobserved characteristics of
these pairs that we cannot control in the regression. Due to this country-year level error
component, we estimate a random eﬀects probit regression to obtain eﬃcient estimates
and corrected standard errors following the two-stage approach set up by Borjas and
Sueyoshi (1994). In fact, individuals within a group (deﬁned by country-year pair) share
a common component in the speciﬁcation of conditional means. This is well suited for the
data set at hand. Individuals are characterized by idiosyncratic features, like age or school
attainment, but share a common environment within a group, like labor market regula-
tions, which diﬀer across countries and over time. Fairlie and Meyer (2003) use a similar
approach to estimate the impact of immigration on native individual self-employment
rates between 1980 and 1990 across metropolitan areas in the United States.
The approach in Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994) consists of two steps. The ﬁrst stage is
a probit regression model using individual-level data:
Pr{Yimt = 1|Ximt} = F (X
0
imtβ + αmt) (16)
where Yimt = 1 if the individual i in country m and year t changes labor market sta-
tus, F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, Ximt is a K-dimensional
vector of individual characteristics, and αmt is a ﬁxed country-year eﬀect. We include
individual-level covariates that previous studies of labor market transitions have consid-
ered: education, age, marital status and gender dummies, and the size of the household.
Additionally, we include variables aimed at capturing the ﬁnancial situation of the house-
hold, such as home ownership and lottery (or inheritance) recipiency. In the case of
transitions out of unemployment, we include a dummy variable for unemployment in-
surance recipiency status, as it has been found to be an important factor in explaining
transitions out of unemployment (Katz and Meyer, 1990).
The duration dependence of labor market transitions has been pointed out in a large
number of studies (Bover, Arellano, and Bentolila, 2002). We are able to tackle this
issue by conditioning transitions in the duration of the ongoing spell. We do this in
our unemployment transition equations by including the duration of the unemployment
14spell. For workers moving out of self-employment we include tenure as self-employed. The
inclusion of these variables makes it possible to interpret the results of both models as
a transition hazard. In fact, not only the formulation of a duration model has a similar
interpretation (since it is a binary model), but also the estimation of a proportional
hazard model of the transition events yield similar qualitative results (Bover, Arellano,
and Bentolila, 2002).
The second stage of Borjas and Sueyoshi’s approach consists of a linear regression
model of the estimates of αmt on the country-year-level variables:
ˆ αmt = Z
0
mtγ + umt (17)
where Zmt is a vector of country-year-level policy and economic variables. The second-
stage coeﬃcient estimates from (17) are in the same metric as the probit coeﬃcients, and
their standard errors account for the group-level component in the error term.
As suggested by Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994), we estimate the second-stage regression
using generalized least squares. The weighting matrix is ˆ Ω = ˆ σ2
˜ uIJ +Vαα, where Vαα is the
portion of the ﬁrst-stage variance matrix corresponding to the dummy variables and J is
the number of country-year combinations. In this expression, ˆ σ2




M). Here, ˆ σ2
j is the variance of the jth dummy of the ﬁrst-stage estimation, and ˜ σ2 =
PJ
j=1 ˜ w2
j/(J−M), where the ˜ wj are the residuals of the second-stage regression. Parameter
γ is then estimated using ˜ γ = (Z0ˆ Ω−1Z)−1Z0ˆ Ω−1ˆ α, with variance matrix given by Σ˜ γ =
(Z0ˆ Ω−1Z)−1.
In our application, the variables included in the second-stage vector Zmt were the
index of labor market ﬂexibility, the level of social security contributions paid by the self-
employed, an index of bureaucracy costs, the logarithm of the country’s average income
in PPP, and the unemployment rate. In addition, we tested several interactions between
some of the policy variables.
The policy variables are motivated by the model and capture the role of the two
mechanisms identiﬁed in the model that aﬀect employment decisions: ﬁring costs and the
costs of being self-employed. The interaction term between these two variables captures
possible non-linearities in the impact of labor market ﬂexibility and social security con-
tributions on transitions between states. As stated above, it is likely that, since the ﬁrst
variable is directed at demand for self-employment and the second one is directed at the
supply side of the market, their full impact on self-employment cannot be captured if they
enter only in levels.5 In order to control for the regulatory level on creating businesses we
5Also note that the force of labor market rigidities may be non-linear (Lazear, 1990, ﬁrst pointed out
this possibility). It can be argued that, for a given ﬁrm, once labor market rigidities get large enough,
no ﬁring occurs and self-employment becomes more important, which implies a non-linear rigidity eﬀect.
Thus, one might include the square of labor market ﬂexibility in the speciﬁcation. This turned out to be
non-signiﬁcant in the regressions performed.
15include an index of bureaucracy taken from the IMD survey (see appendix A for a more
detailed description of the variable and survey question).
The estimated model includes other country-level variables known to signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the decision to enter or leave self-employment, such as the unemployment rate
and the log of GDP per capita (Evans and Leighton, 1989).
In the results reported, a “state transition” is either the event that an unemployed
person moves to self-employment or salaried work, or the event that a self-employed
worker enters a salaried job or unemployment.
5 Empirical results
The model of employment sorting decisions developed in this paper predicts that tran-
sitions between labor market states will be aﬀected by labor market policy variables.
In particular, we will test the validity of these predictions with regard to labor market
ﬂexibility, i.e. the ability of employers to adjust their work-force to their needs, and the
cost of being self-employed, proxied by the burden in income formation imposed by social
security compulsory contributions.
We test the model results using a discrete choice model of employment decision. We
apply a probit model to analyze the transition from unemployment to salaried work
and self-employment and from self-employment to unemployment and salaried work. We
control for spell duration in our transition models in order to capture the eﬀect of duration
dependence on labor market state changes.
5.1 First-stage regression results
The ﬁrst stage of our empirical model consists of a probit regression model using individual-
level data. We estimate this model for the pool of individuals in the EUHP. The four
transitions considered were from unemployment to salaried work and self-employment,
and from self-employment to unemployment and salaried work. In table 5 we present the
results obtained for each of these transitions. Overall, the results were as expected, given
what is known from previous studies on labor market transitions.
Workers with a higher level of education are more likely to leave unemployment,
both for salaried work or self-employment. The education level also decreases transitions
from self-employment to unemployment. These results point to much better employment
prospects for the more educated workers. Note that, in the data, prime-aged unemployed
workers (in the age range 35-45) are more likely to enter self-employment; this probability
decreases when one moves either to the younger or to the older tails. On the contrary,
the probability of moving from unemployment to salaried work monotonically decreases
with age, young individuals being the more likely to move into this type of employment.
16A similar pattern is found in both transitions out of self-employment. Younger workers
are more likely to leave this sector regardless of the destination state.
The data show a negative impact on the probability of transition out of self-employment
and unemployment of labor market status duration. In fact, longer tenure as self-employed
decreases the likelihood of moving out of self-employment either to unemployment or
salaried work. Perhaps more interestingly, longer unemployment duration is associated
with lower transition probabilities for both employment states, except for persons that
have been unemployed for 1 to 5 years. This result is somewhat at odds with the view
of self-employment as an alternative to long periods of unemployment.As expected, re-
cipiency of unemployment insurance beneﬁts has a negative impact in the likelihood of
transitions out of unemployment and the impact is much stronger in changes into self-
employment. Other demographic characteristics also have a clear impact on transitions.
Married unemployed workers have a higher probability of moving into employment, but
married self-employed are less likely to leave the sector. Men are also more likely to leave
unemployment and less likely to leave self-employment. The two variables used to mea-
sure the impact of wealth on transitions also have interesting results. Home ownership
has a clear positive impact on unemployment transitions. Finally, the indicator of lottery
or inheritance recipiency has a positive impact in transitions into self-employment, but
no impact in transitions into salaried work. As expected, this variable has no impact on
transitions out of self-employment, but home ownership has a clear negative impact.
[Table 5 about here.]
5.2 Second-stage results
The second-stage, country-level variables for transitions out of unemployment and out of
self-employment are presented in tables 6 and 7. The linear model regresses coeﬃcients of
the year-country dummies from the ﬁrst-stage regression on a set of country-level variables
that control for policy and aggregate eﬀects.
5.2.1 Transitions out of unemployment
The primary focus of our model is on transitions from unemployment into salaried work
and self-employment. According to the model predictions, transitions from unemploy-
ment to self-employment should decrease with the degree of labor market ﬂexibility and
the level of social security contributions. Conversely, transitions to salaried work are
expected to increase when labor market ﬂexibility and the level of social security contri-
butions increase, thus changing the composition of employment. The reported empirical
evidence generally conﬁrms these predictions. Labor market ﬂexibility and social security
contributions paid by the self-employed have an estimated positive impact in transitions
17to salaried work (column (1)), but the indicator of ﬂexibility is not statistically diﬀer-
ent from zero. As expected, in transitions into self-employment the coeﬃcient on social
security contributions is negative (column (2)), while the one on labor market ﬂexibil-
ity impact is positive but again not statistically diﬀerent from zero. The level of state
eﬃciency, captured by the bureaucracy index variable, is positively associated with tran-
sitions into salaried work and negatively associated with transitions into self-employment.
Thus, in our data, a more eﬃciently working government favors the creation of salaried
employment. The prevalence of self-employment is associated with a more ineﬃcient
bureaucratic environment.
The model also predicts that the probability of entering self-employment or salaried
work from unemployment is aﬀected by the interaction between the two main policy vari-
ables. This is captured by the interaction term of columns (3) and (4). The estimated
coeﬃcient for transitions into self-employment is positive (column (4)). This means that
higher social security contributions signiﬁcantly reduce de ability of ﬂexibility to explain
the probability that a worker enters self-employment. The impact is symmetric when con-
sidering transitions into salaried work. This highlights the important trade-oﬀ that labor
market policies induce in the decisions of agents when sorting into diﬀerent employment
sectors. The two policies considered crowd-out each other’s eﬀects.
The empirical model also includes some macroeconomic variables. In column (1), the
unemployment rate has some ability to predict transitions out of unemployment to salaried
work; higher level of unemployment decreases transitions into regular employment. Con-
trary to what has been found in other studies (Carrasco, 1999), the unemployment rate
does not explain transitions into self-employment. The business cycle can have some eﬀect
on the ability of labor market ﬂexibility to explain transitions, as this variable measures
the adjustment of employment to economic realities. Thus, we also interacted the un-
employment rate with the labor market ﬂexibility index. Again, it proved statistically
diﬀerent from zero when analyzing transitions into salaried work. The interaction term is
negative, meaning that higher unemployment reduces the ability of ﬂexibility to explain
these transitions. In labor markets with larger ﬂexibility, the role of the unemployment
rate is stronger, as one would expect, given that in these economies salaried work is more
exposed to the vagaries of the business cycle; this increases the variance of employment
creation and destruction over the cycle (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999).
[Table 6 about here.]
5.2.2 Transitions out of self-employment
We also study the ability of agents to remain in self-employment.6 We present the results
of probit regressions applied to transitions from self-employment to unemployment and
6Note that in the model self-employed jobs break up at an exogenous rate.
18paid-employment in table 7. Labor market ﬂexibility increases transitions out of self-
employment, in particular to salaried work. The same is true for higher social security
contributions, but interestingly this has a larger impact in driving workers into unemploy-
ment. This result points out to the importance of income formation mechanisms to explain
the composition of self-employment prevailing in European countries. In columns (3) and
(4) we added the interactions with labor market ﬂexibility. The interaction coeﬃcient of
labor market ﬂexibility with social security contributions is positive but imprecisely esti-
mated. Nevertheless, the positive impact suggests that both variables reinforce each other
when shaping transitions out of self-employment. As expected, higher unemployment rate
increases the transitions from self-employment to unemployment, showing some procyli-
cality in the rate of self-employment. This impact is, however, reduced in countries with
more ﬂexible labor markets, specially in transitions into salaried work. Again, as in these
markets the adjustment is made through regular employment, the role of self-employment
is reduced.
Overall, the results conﬁrm those obtained for transitions into unemployment, al-
though weaker in statistical terms. The policy variables considered in our analysis seem
relevant in shaping labor market adjustments through their impact on employment com-
position.
[Table 7 about here.]
5.3 Heterogeneous impact in the labor market
The results presented in the previous sections pooled all the observations in our sample,
but the behavior of the labor market diﬀers considerably along the demographic char-
acteristics of some individuals, most notably gender diﬀerences in terms of labor market
attachment. In fact, female employment decisions are often shaped by household deci-
sions and might end up being more sensitive to the institucional features analyzed in this
paper. If this is the case, the impact of the sorting mechanisms described in section 5.2
above may be diﬀerent in the two groups. To test for this possibility, we estimate the
same set of models in the two sub-samples of males and females and present the results in
table 8. The results do not show a clear pattern distinguishing male and female behavior.
The female sub-sample presents reactions more in accordance with the model predictions.
It is interesting that female transitions into and out of self-employment are quite strongly
associated with the level of social security contributions paid by the self-employed. Given
their lower attachment to the labor force, policy variables appear to act primarily at the
incentive levels of the agents. The results in table 8 place female individuals much more
exposed to changes in policy. This is reinforced by the interaction term between ﬂexibility
and contributions in transitions out of unemployment, which is also larger for female than
for male workers.
19[Table 8 about here.]
5.4 Some policy experiments
A consequence of the previous results is that governments need to be careful when de-
signing employment-enhancing policies, as the impact of diﬀerent measures varies across
recruiting sectors. For instance, increasing labor market ﬂexibility encourages hiring in
the salaried work sector, but this eﬀect is smaller for larger mandatory social security
contributions paid by the self-employed. An interesting experiment is to use the model
and investigate changes when measures in place in diﬀerent countries are applied to the
country under study. This exercise has obvious limitations but provides us with an as-
sessment of the magnitudes involved(for a similar exercise, see Di Tella and MacCulloch,
2005).
Table 9 contains the levels of the variables used in this exercise for selected countries
in 1999, and ﬁgure 2 depicts labor market ﬂexibility against social security contributions
as of 1999, for the countries in the panel. We want to address three types of questions
(everything else constant): how would the probability of transition to a salaried work
position change if the labor market ﬂexibility or social security contributions (or both)
changed? How is this reaction aﬀected by the level of the unemployment rate? What is
the role of bureaucracy in shaping labor market transitions?
[Table 9 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Table 10 presents the results of the experiment. The choice of countries for this
comparison was motivated by the fact that Portugal in 1999 had roughly the same labor
market ﬂexibility as Spain, and the same social security contributions as the UK. Italy
and Finland share the same level of social contributions but not the same degree of
ﬂexibility, and have a high level of unemployment rate. We see from the table that if
social security contributions change from the Portuguese to the Spanish level (from 2.8 to
15.9 percent of output per capita, holding labor market ﬂexibility roughly constant) the
probability of transition from unemployment to salaried work increases 11 percent, while
that of the transition to self-employment decreases 13 percent. The odds of transition to
a salaried work position vis-` a-vis transition to self-employment increase 28 percent. This
is in accordance with the model of section 2.
[Table 10 about here.]
We also document the situation where labor market ﬂexibility is changed while social
security contributions are kept roughly constant. From the table we see that if, instead
20of the Portuguese levels, the UK levels were in place in 1999, the probability of transition
from unemployment to salaried work would increase 30 percent. The transition to self-
employment would also increase by 18 or 17 percent, depending on whether social security
contributions are also changed or not. The odds of transition to salaried work vis-` a-vis
self-employment therefore increase when the labor market is more ﬂexible. The model of
section 2 does not predict that transitions to self-employment also increase when labor
market ﬂexibility increases. Beyond the obvious limitations of the model, there are at
least two potential explanations for this. First, the econometric model might be capturing
eﬀects that are not built into the model, such as the expansion of the participation rate or
diﬀerent break up frequencies for salaried or self-employment jobs. Second, the way labor
market ﬂexibility is modeled is a simpliﬁcation of the complex realities across countries.
The positive eﬀects of labor market ﬂexibility may operate through more complex channels
than those outlined in the theoretical model.
The eﬀects of labor market ﬂexibility may be strongly inﬂuenced by the unemployment
rate and social security contributions, as suggested by the coeﬃcients of the interaction
terms between unemployment and labor market ﬂexibility, and between labor market ﬂex-
ibility and social security contributions, in transitions out of unemployment. Changing
policy variables from the Italian to the Finnish levels (that is, increasing labor market
ﬂexibility while holding social security contributions roughly constant) under high un-
employment yields diﬀerent results. Transitions from unemployment to salaried work
decrease, and transitions to self-employment increase. The odds of transition to salaried
work relative to self-employment decrease 24 percent. This exercise suggests that, under
high unemployment, the adjustment to higher labor market ﬂexibility is made primarily
through transitions to self-employment.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we explore the role of labor market policies aﬀecting the opportunity cost
of two diﬀerent job types (salaried work and self-employment) in explaining diﬀerences in
employment composition across countries and overtime. The empirical evidence obtained
using individual-level data from the European Union Household Panel survey shows that
the positive relationship between labor market ﬂexibility and the transition probabilities
out of unemployment are sensitive to the inclusion of variables capturing the costs of
entering (and remaining in) self-employment. Proxying these costs with the level of social
security contributions paid by the self-employed as a fraction of per capita GDP, the
results obtained document the existence of a non-linear relationship between labor market
ﬂexibility and transitions out of unemployment. More ﬂexible labor markets are associated
with a higher probability of transition to salaried work. This feature can, however, be
crowded-out for suﬃciently high levels of social security contributions. As for transitions
21to self-employment, they are less likely if social security contributions are higher. Again,
this eﬀect can be reduced in the event of a very ﬂexible labor market for a given level of
social security contributions.
These results are motivated by a model of unemployment and employment protection
that includes a speciﬁc role for self-employment. In the model, self-employment and
salaried work are set simultaneously, and that creates an extra channel of ﬂexibility in
the labor market, with an increase in the overall eﬃciency of the economy.
There are important policy implications of these results. Since two diﬀerent policies
aﬀect self-employment in diﬀerent ways, they can undo the eﬀect of each other. Omitting
one of the policies in the analysis may lead us wrongly to conclude that the other has
no eﬀect. Policies that act as a barrier to self-employment might prevent those that
potentially foster self-employment to have perceivable eﬀects. A second policy implication
is the sensitivity of policy eﬀects to unemployment, as it signiﬁcantly aﬀects the way
transitions to salaried work and self-employment respond to changes in labor market
ﬂexibility and social security contributions.
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Appendix A Data
Sample of 13 countries
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
23Deﬁnition of variables
Unemployment rate
The unemployment rate from the OECD Main Economic indicators.
GDP per capita
The log of per capita GDP expressed in constant 1994 prices (millions of PPP $) from
the OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Flexibility
The survey question that we use (classiﬁed as 2.17 Labor-Cost Flexibility in 1984)
asked the respondents: “Flexibility of ﬁrms to adjust job security and compensation
standards to economic realities: 0 = none at all, to 100 = a great deal”. This question
was changed in 1990 to “Flexibility of management to adjust employment levels during
diﬃcult periods: 0 = low, to 100 = high”. Again in 1992 the question was changed
to “Flexibility of hiring and ﬁre practices by the government: 0 = are too restricted by
government, to 100 = are ﬂexible enough”. From the World Competitiveness Report,
IMD Foundation, Geneva. This measure has been re-scaled to the [0,10] interval.
Bureaucracy index
The survey question that we use asked the respondents: “Bureaucracy: does not
hinder business activity: 0 = none at all, to 100 = a great deal”. From the World
Competitiveness Report, IMD Foundation, Geneva.
Self-employed Workers Social Security Contributions
Social security contributions paid by self-employed divided by nominal GDP per capita.
Total social security contributions paid by the self-employed corresponds to code 2300 —
total contributions paid by the self-employed, from the OECD Revenue Statistics.
Appendix B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Deﬁne γj ≡ E[γ|γ ≥ γj], j = SW,SE. This is the expected value of γ conditional on γ
being higher than γj. Since Jj is aﬃne in γ, it is straightforward to show that
∆ = JSW|γ=γSW (1 − G(γSW)) − JSE|γ=γSE (1 − G(γSE)).
24When performing derivatives with respect to A, managers do not take into account their
inﬂuence on U and V , which are economy-wide quantities. The derivative of γj with









, j = SW,SE,
where g is the probability density function associated with G. Noting that
∂γj
∂A = −1, the
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− g(γSE)JSE|γ=γSE.



































Using the expression for Jj, the ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side of this expression
equal 1
2 (r + λ)
−1 (1 − G(γSW)), because Jj is aﬃne in γ and several terms cancel out. The







−1 (1 − G(γSW) − (1 − G(γSE))).
Since γSE > γSW, ∂∆
∂A is positive.
25B.2 Proof of proposition 2
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where Jj and Wj, j = SW,SE, are given by (7), (8), (13) and (14). Using (19) and (20),
we can substitute for E and F in equations (1) and (3). These two equations determine
equilibrium quantities θ and U. Using the Implicit Function Theorem and Leibnitz’s rule,



































































Since q (θ) has negative elasticity, z (θ) has positive elasticity, and the value of being
unemployed is at least as high as the reservation wage (E ≥ U), Λ is negative and all
derivatives are negative except ∂U
∂b .







∂c , which are negative by proposition 2. Also,
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26which is positive. Finally,
∂γSE
∂c


















(1 − p)(1 − G(γSE))
p(1 − G(γSW))
,
which approaches 1 as the share of self-employed relative to the share of salaried workers
(the last multiplicative term in the expression) approaches 0. A suﬃcient condition for
this to happen is that p is suﬃciently close to 1.

















Note: Social security contributions from the OECD Revenue Statistics; GDP per capita from the OECD
Main Economic Indicators.
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Labor market flexibility
Note: Labor market ﬂexibility is an index in interval [0,10]; social security contributions are expressed
as the fraction of output per capita. See Appendix A for the deﬁnition of variables.
29Table 1: Share of non-agricultural self-employment on civilian employment, 1976–2002.
1976 1986 1996 2002
Australia 11.0 12.7 11.8 12.0
Austria 9.5 6.1 6.9 7.8
Belgium 11.1 12.6 14.0 13.7
Canada 6.1 7.2 9.2 8.7
Denmark 9.4 7.0 7.1 7.2
Finland 8.0 6.8 10.3 9.3
France 10.9 9.8 7.7 6.7
Germany 8.8 8.7 9.0 9.4
Greece 30.9 27.5 27.5 25.4
Ireland 10.5 11.1 12.8 12.6
Italy 22.5 21.6 23.3 22.2
Japan 13.6 12.7 9.7 8.8
Netherlands 8.9 8.2 9.8 9.8
New Zealand 9.5 13.4 16.4 15.7
Norway 7.0 6.5 5.5 4.9
Portugal 11.5 16.9 19.7 17.4
Spain 15.2 17.5 18.4 15.5
Sweden 4.4 4.2 9.1 8.5
UK 7.0 10.6 11.9 10.9
USA 6.7 7.4 7.3 6.4
Note: All values in percentage. Source: OECD
Labour Force Statistics.















Austria 4.40 6.6 0.158 0.030 5.3
Belgium 3.93 13.2 0.117 0.031 11.4
Canada 6.02 8.9 0.025 0.034 9.5
Finland 4.73 8.7 0.038 0.029 10.6
France 3.91 9.6 0.214 0.030 10.8
Germany 3.91 8.0 0.115 0.031 7.8
Greece 3.69 27.6 0.030 0.019 8.8
Ireland 5.15 12.8 0.015 0.025 13.6
Italy 3.21 22.2 0.074 0.027 10.3
Japan 5.45 11.3 0.065 0.031 2.9
Netherlands 3.9 8.60 0.461 0.029 6.8
Norway 4.48 6.2 0.058 0.033 4.1
Portugal 3.54 17.8 0.018 0.018 6.3
Spain 2.98 18.1 0.066 0.022 19.5
Sweden 3.85 7.2 0.073 0.030 4.7
Switzerland 6.91 9.9 0.076 0.037 2.4
UK 6.80 11.6 0.024 0.027 8.7
US 7.11 7.5 0.053 0.041 6.0
Note: See Appendix A for the deﬁnition of variables.
31Table 3: Number of observations per transition.
Destination state
Source state SE SW U
SE 42585 2784 705
SW 3104 193123 7180
U 1052 8724 17965
Note: SE is self-employment; SW is
salaried work; U is unemployment. Data
are composed of a panel of workers from
the EUHP over the period 1994–1999.
Variables are deﬁned in section 3.
32Table 4: Summary statistics for salaried workers, self-employed and unemployed.
Salaried worker Self-employed Unemployed
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Household size / 100 0.034 0.014 0.035 0.014 0.037 0.016
First cycle completed * 0.360 0.480 0.468 0.499 0.508 0.500
Secondary cycle completed * 0.369 0.483 0.309 0.462 0.337 0.473
Tertiary cycle completed * 0.254 0.435 0.215 0.411 0.128 0.334
Age 39.489 10.691 44.393 11.169 35.516 12.029
Marital status * 0.668 0.471 0.781 0.414 0.437 0.496
Gender * 0.568 0.495 0.727 0.446 0.496 0.500
Lottery amount ** 0.046 0.289 0.045 0.289 0.030 0.231
Own home * 0.719 0.449 0.808 0.394 0.626 0.484
Unemployment insurance recipient * 0.368 0.482
Labor market ﬂexibility 4.082 1.615 3.863 1.458 3.739 1.418
Social security contributions 0.134 0.133 0.091 0.092 0.126 0.120
log of GDP per capita 0.030 0.005 0.028 0.005 0.029 0.005
Unemployment rate / 100 0.101 0.042 0.111 0.042 0.118 0.048
Bureaucracy index / 100 0.035 0.014 0.030 0.015 0.032 0.015
Observations 198996 33459 27281
Note: Data are composed of a panel of workers from the EUHP over the period 1994–1999. Variables are
deﬁned in section 3. * and ** mean dummy and categorical variables, respectively.
3
3Table 5: Estimates for the ﬁrst-stage regression of a random eﬀects probit model. Dependent
variable: Transition indicator between states.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U to SW U to SE SE to U SE to SW
Household size -2.390 -0.053 4.205 1.221
(4.02) (0.05) (3.47) (1.49)
Secondary cycle completed 0.140 0.175 -0.127 -0.015
(7.02) (4.70) (3.12) (0.55)
Tertiary cycle completed 0.291 0.306 -0.326 0.047
(10.84) (6.53) (6.28) (1.57)
Aged 15–24 1.003 -0.072 0.370 0.658
(22.53) (0.88) (4.11) (10.70)
Aged 25–34 0.955 0.260 0.228 0.368
(23.24) (3.59) (3.60) (9.10)
Aged 35–44 0.828 0.324 0.124 0.214
(20.06) (4.47) (2.08) (5.67)
Aged 45–54 0.553 0.298 0.102 0.142
(13.08) (4.04) (1.77) (3.83)
Married 0.138 0.200 -0.315 -0.122
(6.73) (5.35) (7.98) (4.61)
Male 0.118 0.388 -0.105 -0.062
(6.67) (11.48) (2.92) (2.68)
Lottery 2,000 – 10,000 euros 0.031 0.272 0.044 -0.020
(0.37) (1.92) (0.33) (0.23)
Lottery 10,000 – 50,000 euros 0.054 -0.039 -0.066 0.074
(0.59) (0.20) (0.36) (0.73)
Lottery above 50,000 euros -0.424 0.652 -0.137 -0.499
(1.68) (2.25) (0.36) (1.90)
Own home 0.101 0.059 -0.264 -0.175
(5.39) (1.68) (6.84) (6.77)
Unemp. insur. Recipient -0.098 -0.280
(4.59) (6.82)
Unemp. durat. 1–5 years -0.047 0.023
(2.48) (0.64)
Unemp. duration > 5 years -0.975 -0.381
(35.88) (7.76)
Tenure between 1–3 years -0.162 -0.143
(2.64) (3.44)
Tenure between 4–5 years -0.332 -0.303
(4.28) (6.03)
Tenure between 6–10 years -0.462 -0.364
(6.52) (8.11)
Tenure between 11–15 years -0.514 -0.411
(5.70) (7.61)
Tenure > 15 years -0.215 -0.277
(3.53) (6.72)
Constant -1.308 -1.996 -1.628 -1.464
(5.45) (9.39) (5.79) (5.00)
Observations 27281 27281 33459 33459
Wald test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Data are composed of a panel of workers from the EUHP over the period
1994–1999. Variables are deﬁned in section 3. Year-country dummies omitted.
Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are dichotomous except household
size.
34Table 6: The determinants of transitions from unemployment. Estimates for the second-stage
linear regression model. Dependent variable: Country-year dummy estimates of the ﬁrst-stage
regression model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U to SW U to SE U to SW U to SE
Labor market ﬂexibility 0.026 0.032 0.145 0.037
(1.05) (1.61) (2.75) (0.85)
Social security contributions 0.401 -0.376 1.919 -2.119
(1.86) (2.06) (2.27) (2.60)
Bureaucracy index 8.631 -5.719 9.880 -6.114
(3.29) (2.72) (3.94) (2.90)
S. S. contrib. × Labor market ﬂex. -0.340 0.401
(1.88) (2.20)
Unemp. × Labor market ﬂex. -1.124 -0.301
(2.19) (0.78)
log of GDP per capita -13.807 -12.003 -20.564 -9.285
(2.46) (2.84) (3.49) (2.05)
Unemployment rate -2.584 0.156 1.317 1.297
(4.05) (0.38) (0.68) (0.94)
Observations 60 60 60 60
Note: Data are composed of a panel of workers from the EUHP over the period
1994–1999. Variables are deﬁned in section 3. Standard errors in parentheses. The
number of observations is equal to the number of pairs (country, year) for which we
observe transitions between states.
35Table 7: The determinants of transitions from self-employment. Estimates for the second-stage
linear regression model. Dependent variable: Country-year dummy estimates of the ﬁrst-stage
regression model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SE to U SE to SW SE to U SE to SW
Labor market ﬂexibility 0.035 0.069 0.032 0.214
(1.30) (2.34) (0.53) (3.28)
Social security contributions 0.944 0.484 0.382 0.051
(3.94) (1.78) (0.37) (0.04)
Bureaucracy index 1.106 4.871 0.899 6.135
(0.42) (1.54) (0.34) (2.00)
S. S. contrib. × Labor market ﬂex. 0.125 0.084
(0.55) (0.34)
Unemp. × Labor market ﬂex. -0.062 -1.771
(0.11) (2.75)
log of GDP per capita -14.836 -22.843 -13.698 -26.077
(2.48) (3.30) (2.16) (3.53)
Unemployment rate 2.085 -0.612 2.347 5.819
(3.33) (0.78) (1.12) (2.41)
Observations 57 60 57 60
Note: Data are composed of a panel of workers from the EUHP over the period 1994–
1999. Variables are deﬁned in section 3. Standard errors in parentheses. The number
of observations is equal to the number of pairs (country, year) for which we observe
transitions between states.
36Table 8: The determinants of transitions from unemployment and self-employment. Estimates
for the second-stage linear regression model. Dependent variable: Country-year dummy esti-
mates of the ﬁrst-stage regression model.
Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U to SW U to SE SE to U SE to SW
Labor market ﬂexibility 0.088 0.086 0.038 0.233
(1.63) (1.60) (0.65) (3.78)
Social security contributions 1.734 -1.861 -1.443 -0.318
(1.90) (1.43) (1.01) (0.28)
Bureaucracy index 8.197 -7.696 -4.557 5.925
(3.24) (2.95) (1.83) (2.03)
S. S. contrib. × Labor market ﬂex. -0.264 0.326 0.371 0.189
(1.32) (1.04) (1.21) (0.77)
Unemp. × Labor market ﬂex. -0.658 -0.650 0.048 -2.045
(1.26) (1.34) (0.09) (3.36)
log of GDP per capita -19.679 -6.689 -1.681 -25.843
(3.24) (1.12) (0.27) (3.66)
Unemployment rate 0.270 2.424 3.051 7.237
(0.14) (1.42) (1.67) (3.20)
Observations 60 58 53 59
Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U to SW U to SE SE to U SE to SW
Labor market ﬂexibility 0.214 -0.070 0.013 0.251
(2.70) (0.85) (0.14) (3.99)
Social security contributions 2.190 -2.237 2.492 2.740
(1.77) (1.89) (1.99) (2.18)
Bureaucracy index 10.092 0.150 6.184 7.488
(2.68) (0.04) (1.80) (2.70)
S. S. contrib. × Labor market ﬂex. -0.440 0.446 -0.256 -0.558
(1.67) (1.75) (0.92) (2.06)
Unemp. × Labor market ﬂex. -1.333 0.379 0.027 -1.927
(1.73) (0.54) (0.03) (3.02)
log of GDP per capita -20.136 -13.703 -19.053 -28.227
(2.32) (1.83) (2.25) (3.99)
Unemployment rate 1.631 -1.876 0.399 6.119
(0.56) (0.73) (0.13) (2.67)
Observations 60 54 49 59
Note: Data are composed of a panel of workers from the EUHP over the period
1994–1999. Variables are deﬁned in section 3. Standard errors in parentheses. The
number of observations is equal to the number of pairs (country, year) for which we
observe transitions between states.
37Table 9: Summary statistics of labor market ﬂexibility, social security contributions and unem-
ployment for selected countries in 1999.
Labor market ﬂex. S. S. contributions Unemp. rate Bureaucracy
Italy 2.5 7.0 11.6 1.5
Finland 5.5 5.8 10.1 7.0
Portugal 4.1 2.8 4.5 2.5
Spain 4.1 15.9 15.8 4.2
UK 6.2 2.2 6.1 3.8
Note: Data are composed of a panel of workers from the EUHP over the period
1994–1999. Variables are deﬁned in section 3. Labor market ﬂexibility is an index in
interval [0,10]; social security contributions are expressed as the percentage of output
per capita; unemployment rate is in percentage.
38Table 10: Eﬀects of changes in policy: labor market ﬂexibility and social security contributions.
Increase in:
Transition/odds Lab. mark. ﬂex. only S. sec. contrib. only Both factors
Portuguese to Spanish levels (increase in soc. sec. contributions)
U→SW 100 111 111
U→SE 100 87 87
Odds U→SW vs. U→SE 0 28 28
Portuguese to UK levels (increase in labor market ﬂexib.)
U→SW 130 100 130
U→SE 118 101 117
Odds U→SW vs. U→SE 10 -1 11
Italian to Finnish levels (increase in labor market ﬂexib., high unemp.)
U→SW 94 97 94
U→SE 124 104 124
Odds U→SW vs. U→SE -24 -7 -24
Note: Data are composed of a panel of workers from the EUHP over the period 1994–1999. Variables
are deﬁned in section 3. Except for the odds, all values are the percentage of the original country’s
levels as of 1999. At the individual level, the typical subject is the same as in table 5. The odds are
expressed as the percentage change in the ratio of the transition probabilities U→SW and U→SE.
Unemployment is kept at the origin country’s level.
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